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The Framers, Faith, and Tyranny 
Marci A. Hamilton* 
“Cousin America has run off with a Presbyterian parson, 
and that was the end of it.” 
 —Horace Walpole1 
INTRODUCTION 
There was a preponderance of Calvinists at the Constitutional 
Convention, nearly one fifth of whom were graduates of the 
preeminent Presbyterian college of the day, the College of New 
Jersey, which is now Princeton University.2  Over one third had 
direct connections to Calvinist beliefs.  These leaders of the time 
reflected on their collective knowledge and experiences for usable 
theories to craft a governing structure in the face of the crumbling 
Articles of Confederation.  They were in an emergency and felt no 
compunction to distinguish between governing ideas that were 
secular or theological in origin.  
Accounts of the Constitution’s framing rarely credit its 
Calvinist inspiration.  What this Article says on that count might 
come as news, but should come as no surprise: given the Calvinist 
background of many Framers, it would be exceedingly odd if there 
were no traces of Calvinism in the document they produced.  The 
distinctively Calvinist themes in the Framers’ debate included a 
* Fox Family Pavilion Resident Scholar, Program for Research on Reli-
gion and Fels Institute of Government Professor of Practice, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
1. Howard Miller, The Grammar of Liberty: Presbyterians and the First
American Constitutions, 54 J. PRESBYTERIAN HIST. 142, 161 (1976). 
2. See David Bernstein, The Constitutional Convention: Facts and Fig-
ures, 21 HIST. TEACHER 11, 14 (1987). 
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deep and weary belief in human fallibility, the conviction that all 
those holding power would abuse it, the notion that a constitution 
could be constructed, the view that building a constitution was 
experimental, a hope that a machine-like system could check the 
inevitable abuses of power, and a preference for representation over 
direct democracy.  These themes ground the United States 
Government’s earliest development, and a clearer understanding of 
their Calvinist roots will benefit its continued development as 
inevitable abuses of power demand periodic constitutional 
adjustment. 
Not only were a number of Framers Calvinist, but at the same 
time that the Framers met in Philadelphia the Presbyterians met 
across town to craft their own new constitution to structure and 
reform church governance.3  The resulting documents bear striking 
similarities that argue in favor of similar roots. 
The Protestant Reformation (early 1500s to mid-1600s), along 
with its counterpart, the Spanish Inquisition (1478–1834), was a 
vivid historical presence for the Founding generation.  The 
Inquisition was the benchmark for oppressive tyranny, the 
Reformation for the hope of better structuring government, both 
civil and religious.  John Calvin, the great systematic theologian of 
the Reformation, prescribed structural strategies to stem abuses of 
power for both church and state, making his theology relevant not 
only to Protestantism but also to the foundations of modern 
government.4 
Framer James Madison and his mentor, the Reverend John 
Witherspoon, President of the College of New Jersey and leading 
Calvinist, exercised such power over public discourse in their day 
that they could have cemented Calvin’s influence by themselves.  
From the beginning of his tenure, Witherspoon believed that the 
school should operate for the “Glory of God” and the public interest.5  
The emphasis falls on the latter element.  Other elite universities 
were focused on producing clergy, not public service.  He educated 
3. JEFFRY H. MORRISON, JOHN WITHERSPOON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 15–16 (reprt. ed. 2015). 
4. See George J. Gatgounis II, The Political Theory of John Calvin, 110 
CHURCHMAN, 60, 63–69 (1996). 
5. JOHN WITHERSPOON, THE DOMINION OF PROVIDENCE OVER THE PASSIONS
OF MEN (1776), reprinted in THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN WITHERSPOON
126, 144 (Thomas P. Miller ed., paperback ed. 2015) [hereinafter SELECTED 
WRITINGS]. 
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his students to serve the public good, to think as statesmen, and to 
remember the lessons of the Reformation, which he often cited in 
his public lectures and sermons.  At the same time, he instilled in 
Madison and the other Framers in his classes the lessons of the 
influential reformer John Calvin.  In sum, teacher and student 
brought distinctively Calvinist views to the project of constitutional 
design. 
On June 20, 1785, well before Madison appeared at the 
convention, but after he had completed his studies with 
Witherspoon, Madison delivered his deservedly famous A Memorial 
and Remonstrance to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth 
of Virginia.6  Many scholars regard this seminal piece as the 
intellectual basis for the First Amendment’s ban on the 
establishment of religion, grounded in concerns about abuses of 
power by religious leaders.7  In his preparation notes for his speech 
against the Virginia religious assessment bill, he  named the 
“Reformation” as a principle to be taken into account as they 
determined the proper relationship between church and state.8  In 
the document itself, Madison also used the horrors of the 
Inquisition to argue against state support of Christian teachers, 
saying, “[d]istant as it may be in its present form from the 
Inquisition, it differs from it only in degree.”9 
Resorting to only Madison and Witherspoon, however, is not 
necessary, to divine the presence of Calvinism at the Constitutional 
Convention.  Some form of Calvinism played a role in the lives of at 
least twenty-three of the fifty-five Framers.  The two most 
influential on the question of representation—Madison and 
Wilson—were steeped in Calvinist concepts.  Madison attended the 
6. See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments (ca. June 20, 1785), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.ar-
chives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0163 [perma.cc/T4FX-3Y5Z] (last vis-
ited Apr. 18, 2021). 
7. See, e.g., Donald L. Drakeman, Religion and the Republic: James Mad-
ison and the First Amendment, 25 J. CHURCH & STATE 427, 435–37 (1983); 
Mark David Hall, Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, Jefferson’s Statute 
for Religious Liberty, and the Creation of the First Amendment, 3 AM. POL. 
THOUGHT 32, 34–36 (2014). 
8. JAMES MADISON, Notes of Speech Against Assessments for Support of
Religion (Nov. 1784), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 88, 88 (Gillard 
Hunt ed., 1901). 
9. Id.
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College of New Jersey when Witherspoon was at the height of his 
powers and where he was delivered “a strong dose of Calvinism.”10  
James Wilson was raised in a strict Presbyterian home and was 
educated at the Presbyterian St. Andrew’s University of Scotland.11 
The theology of John Calvin generated three major traditions: 
the Presbyterian, the Congregationalist, and the Continental 
Reformed.12  The majority of those at the Convention who were 
affiliated in some way with Calvinism were influenced by 
Presbyterianism.  Ten Framers were educated at the College of 
New Jersey.13  Six of the Framers were practicing Presbyterians,14 
including Hugh Williamson of North Carolina, who was at one time 
10. Thomas P. Miller, Introduction to SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 5, at
1, 34.  On issues of religious liberty, Madison was also influenced by other 
Presbyterian clerics.  See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 260 (fiftieth anniversary ed. 2017) (stating that the Vir-
ginia Declaration of Rights was written by James Madison, who was “confess-
edly influenced by the claims of Presbyterians and the ‘persecuted Baptists’ as 
well as by enlightenment ideals”). 
11. See GEOFFREY SEED, JAMES WILSON 3–5 (1978) (discussing Wilson’s ed-
ucation at St. Andrew’s University and stating that Wilson studied the com-
pulsory subjects of Latin, Greek, philosophy, science, and mathematics, as well 
as the optional subject of civil history). 
12. Richard O. Cowan, Reformed Protestantism, THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS (Jan. 23, 2021), https://www.churchofje-
suschrist.org/study/ensign/1972/02/reformed-protestantism?lang=eng 
[perma.cc/RS2Z-RS72]. 
13. Bernstein, supra note 2, at 14.  These members included: Gunning
Bedford (DE); David Brearly (NJ); William R. Davie (NC); Jonathan Dayton 
(NJ); Oliver Ellsworth (CT); William Churchill Houston (NJ); James Madison 
(VA); Alexander Martin (NC); Luther Martin (MD); and William Paterson (NJ). 
See Meet the Framers of the Constitution, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.ar-
chives.gov/founding-docs/founding-fathers [https://perma.cc/27LE-ZAFD] (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2021).  George Clymer (PA) retired to Princeton in anticipation 
of sending his children there, but apparently did not attend himself.  3 
BIOGRAPHY OF THE SIGNERS OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 162 (John 
Sanderson ed., 2d ed. 1831). 
14. See Guy S. Klett, A Phase of the Religious Influence in the Formation
of our National Government, 24 J. PRESBYTERIAN HIST. SOC’Y 129, 132-33 
(1946).  These members included: William Churchill Houston (NJ); William 
Livingston (NJ); James McHenry (MD); Hugh Williamson (NC); William Pat-
erson (NJ); and James Wilson (PA).  Id.  Gunning Bedford (DE) also may have 
been Presbyterian.  See id.  James Wilson later converted to Anglicanism.  See 
Mark D. Hall, James Wilson: Presbyterian, Anglican, Thomist, or Deist?: Does 
it Matter, in THE FOUNDERS ON GOD AND GOVERNMENT 181, 187–88 (Daniel L. 
Dreisbach et al. eds., 2004). 
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a Presbyterian minister.15  Of those Framers who attended the 
College, five studied under the Reverend John Witherspoon while 
he was President of the College,16 and four others studied under 
Samuel Finley, who was deeply influenced by Witherspoon.17  Two 
of the Framers were trustees of the College.18  Three other Framers 
may have had some meaningful contact with Presbyterianism.19  
There were also several Framers with non-Presbyterian ties to 
the Calvinist tradition.  Three of them were Congregationalists, an 
offshoot of Calvinism.20  Two others acknowledged Calvinist 
influences: Robert Yates considered himself a Calvinist21 and 
studied law under Presbyterian William Livingston, while Roger 
15. See Louis W. Potts, Hugh Williamson: The Poor Man’s Franklin and
the National Domain, 64 N.C. HIST. REV. 371, 372 (1987). 
16. MORRISON, supra note 3, at 4.  These members included: David Brearly
(NJ); William R. Davie (NC); Jonathan Dayton (NJ); Oliver Ellsworth (CT); 
William Churchill Houston (NJ); and James Madison (VA).  See Meet the Fram-
ers of the Constitution, supra note 13. 
17. See id.  These members included: Oliver Ellsworth (CT); Alexander
Martin (NC); Luther Martin (MD); and William Paterson (NJ).  Id. 
18. See MARK A. NOLL, PRINCETON AND THE REPUBLIC, 1768–1822: THE
SEARCH FOR A CHRISTIAN ENLIGHTENMENT IN THE ERA OF SAMUEL STANHOPE
SMITH 90 (1989) (stating that William Livingston and William Paterson of the 
New Jersey delegation to the Convention were trustees of the school). 
19. Jared Ingersoll, Jr., (PA) was buried in a Presbyterian cemetery.  The
Founding Fathers: Pennsylvania, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.ar-
chives.gov/founding-docs/founding-fathers-pennsylvania#ingersoll 
[https://perma.cc/M5KZ-MNX7] (last visited Apr. 18, 2021).  Alexander Hamil-
ton (NY) was educated as a child by Presbyterian missionaries, see Klett supra 
note 14, at 132, though later rejected by College of New Jersey, RON CHERNOW, 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 63-64 (2004).  And George Washington (VA) reportedly 
attended Presbyterian services on occasion.  See MARY V. THOMPSON, “IN THE 
HANDS OF A GOOD PROVIDENCE”: RELIGION IN THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 
99 (2008).  In total, there were seventeen Framers that were Presbyterian 
themselves or had meaningful or potential connections to Presbyterianism: 
Bedford, Brearly, Davie, Dayton, Ellsworth, Hamilton, Houston, Ingersoll, Liv-
ingston, Madison, McHenry, A. Martin, L. Martin, Paterson, Washington, Wil-
liamson, and Wilson.  See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text. 
20. These members included: Oliver Ellsworth (CT); Elbridge Gerry (MA);
and Caleb Strong (MA).  See Meet the Framers of the Constitution, supra note 
13. 
21. M.E. BRADFORD, FOUNDING FATHERS: BRIEF LIVES OF THE FRAMERS OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 49 (2d ed. 1994). 
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Sherman had a “Puritan bearing” and “strong ties to the 
congregationalist establishment.”22  
The ten Framers who were educated at the College of New 
Jersey—Bedford, Brearly, Davie, Dayton, Ellsworth, Houston, 
Madison, Alexander Martin, Luther Martin, and Paterson—were 
steeped in Calvinist precepts in the College’s curriculum and the 
compulsory twice-daily chapel.23  The College was founded for and 
“devoted to the interests of religion and learning,”24 where the 
Reverend Witherspoon was “himself a whole staff of instructors.”25 
This Article delves into the Calvinist influences at the 
Constitutional Convention for the purpose of illuminating guiding 
principles of the constitutional design.  In Part I, the Article 
describes the Presbyterian influences at the time, including the 
leading Presbyterian cleric and instructor, the form of the 
Presbyterian polity, and the role of representation in the 
Presbyterian scheme.  Part II describes Calvin’s theories of 
representation and governance.  Part III delineates the Calvinist 
education of the Framers.  Part IV examines the scheme of 
representation in the Constitution in light of the Calvinist themes 
previously described.  This history puts into context claims that this 
is a “Christian Nation” as that phrase has been foisted on the public 
in recent decades.  My conclusion is that a dominant Christian 
influence among the Framers—Calvinism¾translates into a 
principle of distrust of every person who holds power—Christian or 
not—combined with a hope that a well-designed system could deter 
the inevitable temptations to abuse power.  From this 
understanding, the contemporary claim that this is a “Christian 
Nation” that creates a privileged class of Americans who will 
unilaterally dictate policy choices according to their God is a grab 
for overwhelming power, not a legitimate interpretation of the 
Constitution’s foundational principles. 
22. John Witte, Jr., The Integration of Religious Liberty, 90 MICH. L. REV.
1363, 1376 (1992). 
23. 2 VARNUM LASING COLLINS, PRESIDENT WITHERSPOON: A BIOGRAPHY 148
(1925). 
24. Id. at 131.
25. Id. at 84.
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I. THE PRESBYTERIAN INFLUENCES AT THE TIME OF THE FRAMING
A. The Instructor: The Reverend John Witherspoon
The Reverend John Witherspoon was a remarkable man whose
pivotal role in the Founding has been forgotten in constitutional 
scholarship.  A Scotsman by birth, and a highly successful 
Presbyterian minister, he was persuaded to come to the colonies in 
1768 to head the College of New Jersey.26  Witherspoon was a 
rugged and passionate man and an outspoken patriot.  His passion 
was not limited to church or theology or even advocating 
independence from Great Britain.  He railed as emphatically about 
the need for a sound economic policy, the perils of inflation, and the 
evils of price fixing.27  One English officer declared that 
Witherspoon was a “political firebrand, who perhaps had not a less 
share in the Revolution than Washington himself.”28  He was one 
of several influential clergymen during the Revolutionary War, but 
the only clergy member whose influence was felt through the 
drafting of the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of 
Confederation, the Continental Congress, and through his 
students, the Constitutional Convention.29  
Witherspoon was the most prominent and authoritative 
spokesman for Presbyterian precepts in the states during the period 
of the Revolution and the Constitution’s framing.  A widely 
respected Calvinist theologian and a gifted preacher, he led the 
College to become the “‘school of statesmen’ during the 
Revolutionary period” and a “highly regarded nursery for the 
republican principles of the new nation.”30  “Republican” derives 
from the Latin res publica, which combines the Latin res for “thing, 
affairs and business” with publica for “the public or commons.”31  
Witherspoon trained his students to serve the public.  
26. MORRISON, supra note 3, at 2.
27. See id. at 8.
28. COLLINS, supra note 23, at 133.
29. COLLINS, supra note 23, at 3–5, 183.
30. NOLL, supra note 18, at 52, 54 (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON 
WERTENBAKER, PRINCETON 1746–1896, at 80 (1946)). 
31. See Andre Munro, Republic, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britan-
nica.com/topic/republic-government [https://perma.cc/2C77-FSF2] (last up-
dated Aug. 7, 2019). 
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For Witherspoon, the Reformation was analogous to America’s 
rejection of British rule and its establishment of a new form of 
government.  The Reformation, remembered by Calvinists as a 
crusade to return the Christian church to its roots by structural 
reform, served as a powerful model.  It was not enough simply to 
replace the corrupt Church leaders, but rather necessary to remove 
them all and then rebuild the structure of the Church with 
mechanisms intended to prevent corruption in the future. 
Witherspoon saw in the Revolution an analogous response to 
tyranny, a response that was necessary to wrest states from the 
corrupt leaders in the Parliament and on the British throne.32  In a 
sermon delivered at the College on May 17, 1776, two months before 
independence was declared, Witherspoon linked the birth of 
America with the Reformation:  
 [A]t the time of the Reformation when religion began to
revive, nothing contributed more to facilitate its reception
and increase its progress than the violence of its
persecutors.  Their cruelty and the patience of the sufferers
naturally disposed men to examine and weigh the cause to
which they adhered with so much constancy and
resolution.  At the same time also, when they were
persecuted in one city, they fled to another and carried the
discoveries of Popish fraud to every part of the world.  It
was by some of those who were persecuted in Germany that
the light of the Reformation was brought so early into
Britain.
. . . . 
 . . . [T]he violent persecution which many eminent 
Christians met with in England from their brethren, who 
called themselves Protestants, drove them in great 
numbers to a distant part of the New World, where the 
light of the gospel and true religion were unknown.33  
Later in the sermon, Witherspoon echoed this Reformation theme 
of the weak but courageous opponents of powerful tyrants by 
invoking the Biblical story of David, whom he described as a 
“strippling [sic] with his sling and his stone,” and Goliath, “the 
32. See MORRISON, supra note 3, at 75–80.
33. WITHERSPOON, supra note 5, at 135–36.
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champion armed in a most formidable manner.”34  Like the 
Reformation, “the cause in which America is now in arms is the 
cause of justice, of liberty, and of human nature.”35  In this way, he 
made the Revolution and the Reformation one.  He brought this 
Reformation-minded approach to his classroom, where he taught 
his students to distrust those in power, regardless of their title, but 
to place their faith in well-crafted governing structures.36   
B. The Presbyterian Structure at the Time of the Framing
While the Framers were crafting a new central government
and constitution, the Presbyterian Church was instituting its own 
new constitution and structures.  Both conventions met in 
Philadelphia at the same time, facing similar problems and 
devising strikingly similar solutions.  Witherspoon chaired the 
committee that framed the Presbyterian Constitution.37  Some 
have asserted that in framing the constitution of the Church his 
opinions were all but dominant.38  This may be a bit hyperbolic, for 
it appears that he did not even attend all of the meetings discussing 
the framing.39  There is little question, though, that his vision of 
the proper polity was borne out by the constitution drafted, that he 
was a highly respected member of the committee, and therefore 
that he likely had significant influence on the product even though 
not physically present at every committee meeting.   
Witherspoon’s committee met in Philadelphia while his 
students met across town to construct the federal government.40  So 
it is no more coincidence that an explanation of the Presbyterian 
polity’s constitutional structure can serve nicely as a template for 
understanding choices made by the Framers regarding 
representation.  
34. Id. at 139.
35. Id. at 140.
36. See Miller, supra note 10, at 32–34.
37. COLLINS, supra note 23, at 3–5.
38. See, e.g., DAVID WALKER WOODS, JOHN WITHERSPOON 173–81 (1906)
(stating that where Witherspoon contributed to the Presbyterian Constitution 
it “may be regarded practically as Witherspoon’s work”). 
39. LEONARD J. TRINTERUD, THE FORMING OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION: A 
RE-EXAMINATION OF COLONIAL PRESBYTERIANISM 287–95 (1949). 
40. COLLINS, supra note 23, at 160.
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The spirit of the Presbyterian Constitution, as well as that of 
the United States Constitution, is captured in the Presbyterian 
phrase, “reformed, always reforming.”  Neither convention thought 
it possible to create a perfect governing system, but both acted on 
the reformist conviction that a suitable structure could be crafted 
to deter future abuses of power.  Moreover, such a governing 
structure was not set in stone, but rather could and should be 
adjusted when its shortcomings were revealed.   
During the Revolutionary period, there was a lively debate 
between Presbyterians and Congregationalists over the issue of 
proper church structure.  Presbyterians, who drew on the 
organization of the Scottish Kirk, favored a representative 
structure, while the Congregationalists tended to favor town-
meeting-style democracy.41  One Presbyterian minister “poured 
pages of inky contempt on Congregational [or direct] democracy,” 
arguing against its “localism, independence, [and] individualism.”42  
The colonial Presbyterians, just as Calvin had before them, 
disdained the anarchy of direct democracy almost as much as 
despotic tyranny.43  Moreover, they saw direct parallels between 
the structural necessities of church and civil government.44  For the 
Presbyterians, government—as opposed to the direct democracy of 
the Congregationalists—was necessary in order to avoid anarchy, 
licentiousness, and disorder:  
Man’s depraved apostate Condition renders Government 
needful.  Needful both in the State and in the Church.  In 
the former without Government Anarchy wou’d soon take 
place with all its wild and dire Effects and Men wou’d be 
like the Fishes of the Sea where the greater devour the less.  
Nor is Govern[ment] in the Church less needful than in the 
State and this for the same Reason.45  
While Presbyterians rejected direct democracy, they equally 
disliked the top-down structure of an Anglican or Episcopalian 
41. See Leonard J. Kramer, Presbyterians Approach The American Revo-




45. Id. (quoting Minutes of the Synod of New England, 1776–1782).
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bishopric order.46  As did the United States Constitution, the 
Presbyterian representative system tried to find a middle ground 
between monarchical rule by one and anarchical direct democracy 
by all.  The United States Presbyterian Church’s Constitution 
reflects the preference for representation and responsible leaders 
expressing independent judgment over direct democracy: 
“Presbyters [representatives within the church] are not simply to 
reflect the will of the people, but rather to seek together to find and 
represent the will of Christ. . . .  Decisions shall be reached in 
councils by vote, following opportunity for discussion and 
discernment, and a majority shall govern.”47  In short, 
representatives were called to a higher vision than the will of the 
people, though in pursuing the larger good they were the people’s 
trustees.  
The United States Presbyterian representative structure owes 
its origins to the Scottish Presbyterian Kirk and  “springs from its 
theology.”48  In 1797, the building blocks of the American 
Presbyterian system that were “radical,” by which they meant, 
“fundamental and basic,” were described as a representative 
structure.49  Governing power was vested not in individuals, like 
the bishops of the Catholic or Episcopalian Churches, but rather in 
representatives whose role was to serve as trustees for their 
46. See id. at 83.
47. UNITED STATES PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, 2 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.): BOOK OF ORDER 2019–2021, at 14 (2019) [here-
inafter BOOK OF ORDER]. 
48. FRANK A. BEATTIE, COMPANION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.): POLITY FOR THE LOCAL CHURCH 15 (2007). 
49. BOOK OF ORDER, supra note 47, at 13 n.6.  The Presbyterians described
that structure in this way: 
That the several different congregations of believers, taken collec-
tively, constitute one Church of Christ, called emphatically the 
Church; that a larger part of the Church, or a representation of it, 
should govern a smaller, or determine matters of controversy which 
arise therein; that, in like manner, a representation of the whole 
should govern and determine in regard to every part, and to all the 
parts united: that is, that a majority shall govern; and consequently 
that appeals may be carried from lower to higher governing bodies 
[councils], till they be finally decided by the collected wisdom and 
united voice of the whole Church.  
Id. 
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constituents.50  The Scottish and United States Presbyterian 
system consisted of layers of elected representatives—including the 
session, the presbyteries, the synods, and the General Assembly— 
that were organized in a hierarchical fashion.51  Each lower body 
reported to the higher bodies.52  The sessions, the presbyteries, and 
the synods are analogous to the secular world’s local, county, and 
state governments, respectively in the sense that they are divided 
along geographical lines.  The General Assembly is the national 
ruling body.53  
Like the branches of government in the federal Constitution, 
each of the Presbyterian Church’s governing bodies was “separate 
and independent” from the others.54  Also like the Constitution and 
following Calvin’s division of duties between different offices, the 
power of each body was “limited by the express provisions of the 
Constitution, with powers not mentioned being reserved to the 
presbyteries” and “with the acts of each subject to review by the 
next higher governing body.”55  The system first appeared in the 
Scottish Presbyterian Kirk and is described in the contemporary 
Presbyterian Constitution as follows (each principle here described 
has been a staple of the United States’ Presbyterian structure since 
its inception):  
The Session.  Within each particular church, the members 
are to elect ruling elders.56  Along with the minister (or 
ministers), who are also elected, the elders form the 
church’s “session,”57 which is charged with leadership of 
the congregation in many arenas, including evangelization, 
mission, worship, church school, and stewardship.58  
50. WILLIAM HENRY ROBERTS, THE PRESBYTERIAN SYSTEM: ITS 
CHARACTERISTICS, AUTHORITY, AND OBLIGATION 35 (1895). 
51. See id.; ROBERT MCAFEE BROWN, THE PRESBYTERIANS 8–9 (1966).
52. BOOK OF ORDER, supra note 47, at 14 (“A higher council shall have the
right of review and control over a lower one and shall have power to determine 
matters of controversy upon reference, complaint, or appeal.”). 
53. See id. at 57.
54. Id. at B-8.
55. Id. at 14, 41.
56. See id. at 48–49.
57. “Session” is defined as “the council for the congregation.”  Id.
58. See id.
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The Presbyteries.  The presbyteries are composed of 
selected elders and all ministers from each of the sessions 
within a designated geographical region.59  “The 
presbytery is responsible for the government of the church” 
in that district.60  
The Synods.  Each synod is composed of representatives 
of no less than three presbyteries in a geographical area.61  
The representatives in a synod are elected by the 
presbyteries.62  The “[s]ynod is responsible for the life and 
mission of the church throughout its region.”63  
The General Assembly.  The General Assembly is 
composed of a set number of elders and ministers from each 
presbytery.64  The Assembly “constitutes the bond of union, 
community, and mission among all its congregations and 
councils.”65  
In sum, the Presbyterian levels of government operated as a 
set of overlapping representative structures, defined by (1) an 
individual church; (2) a geographical region; (3) a larger 
geographical region; and (4) a national body.  They bear a strong 
and obvious resemblance to city, county, state, and national levels 
of government.  
The Presbyterian Constitution, like the United States 
Constitution, also mixes direct and indirect representation.  Some 
representatives—those in the session—are directly elected by the 
people, while others are chosen from or by intermediate governing 
bodies.  This element underscores the Calvinist distaste for the 
anarchy they perceived that necessarily followed from placing too 
much power in the people, or the mob.66  The Framers relied on the 
same view and employed the same tactic of mixing direct with 
59. See id. at 50.
60. Id. at 51.
61. Id. at 54.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 55.
64. See id. at 57.
65. Id.
66. See Kramer, supra note 41, at 72.
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indirect representation.67  Members of the House of 
Representatives were always directly elected but the selection of 
Senators was indirect (until the ratification of the Seventeenth 
Amendment in 1913) and the President’s election continues to be 
indirect under the Electoral College.68  
C. The Representative and the People in the Presbyterian
Structure
The Presbyterian scheme is premised on a belief in “the right 
of the Christian laity to participate, through its chosen 
representatives, in the government of the Church.”69  The 
Presbyterian Constitution states: “The government of this church 
is representative, and the right of God’s people to elect presbyters 
and deacons is inalienable.  Therefore, no person can be placed in 
any ordered ministry in a congregation or council of the church 
except by election of that body.”70  The Presbyterian members’ 
representatives are the people’s trustees and answer to a calling 
higher than the individual desires of the people.71  Once elected, the 
presbyters are not subject to a people’s right to instruct and are not 
limited by the views of the majority of electors.72  Rather, there is a 
“double duty . . . that of the people who choose their rulers, and that 
of the representatives to whom is entrusted the exercise of this 
delegated authority.”73  
Whatever other sources the Framers had on hand, including 
Enlightenment sources such as John Locke, Edmund Burke, David 
Hume, and Roman and Greek history, Calvin’s theories, explaining 
and justifying representation, were indispensable to their 
establishing a representative democracy, and illuminated their 
67. See C. MICHAEL BARRY, THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: THE FOURTH FORM OF
GOVERNMENT 15–16 (2011). 
68. See U.S CONST. amend. XVII, § 1; Origins and Development, U.S. 
SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Ori-
gins_Development.htm [perma.cc/RH4X-PW4T] (last visited Apr. 18, 2021). 
69. See FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER, ADDRESS ON THE 200TH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE ADOPTING ACT 9 (1929); see also ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 35 (“[T]he peo-
ple of Christ are entitled to participation in the government of the Church.”). 
70. BOOK OF ORDER, supra note 47, at 25.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 14.
73. COLLINS, supra note 23, at 128.
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difficult task of establishing a representative government.  As 
taught and developed by Witherspoon and his Framer students, 
these theories helped ground and shape the themes—debated 
simultaneously at two constitutional conventions—whose striking 
similarity illuminates their common derivation.  
II. JOHN CALVIN ON REPRESENTATION AND GOVERNMENT: “AN
ARISTOCRACY BORDERING ON DEMOCRACY” 
Nearly all constitutional thought builds on a fundamental 
theory, whether or not acknowledged, and that is a theory of the 
human capacity to accomplish good or evil.  The Framers built the 
United States’ governing system and its supporting structure of 
representation on theory bearing strong resemblance to the 
Calvinist position, which assumes the human tendency to evil as it 
hopes for the accomplishment of good.74  In fact, many of the 
Framers were steeped in Reformation theology, particularly 
through the Presbyterian Church and especially through the 
Reverend John Witherspoon’s teachings on the political theology of 
Calvin and John Knox. 
But Reformation theology’s contribution to representation 
theory cannot fully be understood before considering the historical 
circumstances of its origin.  After all, John Calvin and John Knox—
along with Martin Luther and other reformers—were not simply 
theorizing about governance but rather reacting to the sixteenth-
century Roman Catholic Church, which had become tyrannical and 
corrupt following centuries of overweening power.  
A. Before the Reformation
Historians divide the period leading up to the Reformation into
three eras.  First, the Catholic Church successfully disseminated 
Christianity from the fifth to the eleventh centuries.75  Second, it 
dominated through a theocracy from the twelfth to the fourteenth 
centuries.76  Finally, it disintegrated.77  During the era of 
dissemination, the Church came to own vast amounts of property 
74. See Kramer, supra note 41, at 72; BARRY, supra note 67, at 15–16.
75. See THOMAS BOKENKOTTER, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH 1–2 (2005). 
76. See id.
77. See id. at 2.
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and became an integral and powerful part of the feudal system.78  
By the thirteenth century, Pope Innocent III—who initiated the 
Inquisition—was a powerful papal monarch who controlled “a vast 
ecclesiastical machinery” that regulated the moral and social 
behavior of all medieval people including kings and princes.79  The 
rulers of the time were the clergy and they were accountable to no 
one.  As Roland Bainton explains: 
The Church claimed to be the director of society not by 
reason of the goodness of churchmen but by virtue of the 
prerogative of the clergy alone to celebrate the sacraments, 
through which exclusively salvation is meditated to men 
. . . .  For that reason the meanest priest was greater than 
the loftiest emperor.  The latter could confer on man only 
tranquility on earth.  The former could convey the peace of 
heaven.80 
As the most holy of all clergy, the pope was the arbiter of 
Europe.  “With spiritual weapons alone, he held sway from 
Gibraltar to Jerusalem, from Stockholm to Constantinople, as the 
vice-regent of Christ and shepherd of the faithful.”81  So when the 
Church encountered financial troubles in the fourteenth century, it 
did not take challenges to its enormous power lying down.82  
King Philip of France, wanting to raise revenue, imposed heavy 
taxes on clergy.83  Pope Boniface angrily responded by declaring 
that anyone who taxed clerical property without authorization 
would be excommunicated.84  Philip retaliated by prohibiting the 
exportation of any monies from France to Rome and effectively cut 
off “a major source of papal revenue.”85   
78. See id.
79. Id. at 1–2.
80. ROLAND H. BAINTON, THE REFORMATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
10–11 (1952). 
81. Id. at 11.
82. See BOKENKOTTER, supra note 75, at 180.
83. Id. at 179–80.
84. Id. at 180.
85. Id.
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The Church’s finances were devastated.86  At the same time, 
the development of monetary and financial institutions was 
transforming the European economy from an in-kind barter-based 
system to a money-based one.87  The Church turned to innovative 
ways to amass wealth in the face of its financial woes, including 
seizing the income of its own clergy and invading the coffers of its 
parish churches.88  Early Italian banks served the needs of the 
Church by effectuating international money transfers.89  In 
working on behalf of the Church they routinely violated the 
prohibition against charging and paying interest.90 
However, the Church’s most successful gambit became the 
most notorious symptom of its fall from grace: the sale of salvation 
through indulgences.  The Church sold indulgences as merits in 
heaven.91  The purchase of these merits, the parishioners were told, 
could ameliorate the sinfulness of mortals on earth and “shorten 
their own time in purgatory.”92  The cost of the indulgence was 
calibrated to the size or depth of the sin.93  
During the Renaissance (1350–1600), the papacy was an 
amalgam of powers, with elements of an Italian city-state, a 
European power, and the vice-regent of Christ.94  These three 
mantles offered popes the ability to exercise power over every 
sphere of society without accountability.95  The popes of this era 
ranged from despotic to indolent, from warmongers to rakes.96  In 
this period “[t]he papacy became an Italian Renaissance court and 
the pope was increasingly perceived to be nothing more than an 
Italian prince whose problems and interests were now local and 
86. See W. C. TAYLOR, HISTORY OF FRANCE AND NORMANDY: FROM THE 
EARLIEST TIMES TO THE YEAR 1860, 116–17 (1860). 
87. E. DAMSGAARD HANSEN, EUROPEAN ECONOMIC HISTORY: FROM
MERCANTILISM TO MAASTRICHT AND BEYOND 49–50 (2001). 
88. M.A. Costello, Obligationes pro Annatis Diocesis Ardfertensis, 21
ARCHIVIUM HIBERNICUM 1, 1–2 (J. O’Connell ed., 1958). 
89. HANSEN, supra note 87, at 52.
90. Id.
91. G. R. ELTON, REFORMATION EUROPE 1517–1559, at 18–19 (2d. ed. 1999).
92. Id. at 19.
93. See id.
94. BAINTON, supra note 80, at 15.
95. See id.
96. Id. at 17–18.
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egoistic rather than universal and pastoral.”97  Two particular 
popes exemplify the papacy of this time period.  Pope Alexander VI 
(1431–1503, pope from 1492) won the papacy largely through 
bribery.98  He had a penchant for sexual promiscuity and his many 
mistresses bore him at least eight known children.99  Pope Julius II 
(1443–1513, pope from 1503) was proficient in “the art of war.”100  
He continued the effort to “expel all foreigners from Italy” and 
commanded troops “with such strength and drive that he became 
known as terribilita, the terrible man.”101  There was no structure 
within the church that limited such abuses of power or provided 
incentives for more virtuous leadership, nor was there a 
governmental scheme or other secular power capable of bringing 
the church or its leaders to account.  Because the church 
distinguished the office from the man, a man could hold office of 
pope and claim infallibility as an emolument of that office—even as 
he publicly sinned time and again.  The office thus remained pure 
though its occupant was not. 
As early as the twelfth century, there were calls to reform this 
corrupt state of affairs, which were echoed in the papal schism of 
1378–1417, and then in the appearance of sects that separated 
themselves from the Church.102  But by the time of Calvin no 
internal methods of reform had succeeded in bringing the Church 
back to a truer path.  
B. Historical Sources
1. John Calvin
John Calvin (1509–1564) responded to the sixteenth century’s
Roman Catholic Church with passionate disillusionment and a 
seminal political theology.  Unlike Martin Luther (1483–1546), who 
focused solely on the theological shortcomings of Roman Catholic 
Church practices in the sixteenth century, Calvin prescribed a 
structural fix for the Church’s organization and for civil 
97. CARTER LINDBERG, THE EUROPEAN REFORMATIONS 53 (1996).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 53–54.
101. Id. at 54.
102. See BAINTON, supra note 80, at 14.
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government as well.103  Luther attacked at the level of theory while 
Calvin focused on the pragmatic operation of the institution.   
There is an unstated premise underlying Calvin’s landmark 
Institutes of the Christian Religion: the Church, of all institutions, 
should not have been subject to corruption.104  Calvin was plainly 
disgusted with the sinfulness of the Church’s leaders.105  His 
response, however, was not aimed at individuals per se because he 
accepted the inherent fallibility of all humans.106  The system was 
as blameworthy as the errant individual.107  Thus, replacing the 
leaders would not be enough.108   
Calvin sought to construct a system that would deter Church 
leaders from sinning in the future by instituting representation and 
accountability.  As long as the Church leaders were not accountable, 
the papacy and lesser clergy would be too easily tempted by wealth 
and power.  In creating a system that would check them, Calvin 
wished not to destroy the Church, but to restore its integrity.109  He 
was, on his own term, not a revolutionary, but a reformer—literally.  
a. The Foundation of Distrust and Hope
Calvin built the reformed Church on a now familiar Protestant
theological foundation, the paradoxical union of original sin and 
divine grace.  Calvinism, perhaps more than any other protestant 
theology, embraces the paradox that man is corrupt by nature but 
is also capable of doing good.  In this paradoxical union, hope, 
triumph, and possible defeat are mingled.110  Calvin rejected the 
103. See generally JOHN CALVIN, THE NECESSITY OF REFORMING THE CHURCH
(Casey Carmichael trans., Ligonier Ministries 2020) (1544). 
104. See 1 JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 14 (John T.
McNeill ed. & Ford Lewis Battles trans., reprt. ed. 2006) [hereinafter 1 CALVIN, 
INSTITUTES]. 
105. See id.
106. See id. at 23.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 25.
109. See id. at 26.
110. Cf. SØREN KIERKEGAARD, THE CONCEPT OF ANXIETY 43–44 (Reidar
Thomte trans., ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1980) (1844) (conceptualizing the 
spirit as both a “hostile” and “friendly power”). 
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Platonic notion111 that knowing good produces good: “[M]uch as 
man desires to follow what is good, still he does not follow it.”112  
Though people choose to sin, sin is inevitable.113  Only the presence 
of God’s grace makes it possible for the human will to be exercised 
for good.114  Without grace, human will is corrupt and tends to 
evil.115  Thus, good and evil are both truly possible.  Humans can 
hope for the best but expect the worst from each other and from the 
societal institutions they devise.   
When Calvin’s views were presented in the context of a 
systematic theology, they were sharpened by the reality of the 
corruption of his day and tested in Geneva, a center for Church 
reformation.  His observations of the Church left him without a 
preternatural distrust of human motives, beliefs, and actions.116  
According to Calvin, there was never a moment in history when 
humanity could be trusted blindly as good—and there is not social 
organization that can guarantee the generation of good: 
[L]et us hold this as an undoubted truth which no siege
engines can shake: the mind of man has been so completely
estranged from God’s righteousness that it conceives,
desires, and undertakes, only that which is impious,
perverted, foul, impure, and infamous.  The heart is so
steeped in the poison of sin, that it can breathe out nothing
but a loathsome stench.  But if some men occasionally
make a show of good, their minds nevertheless ever remain
enveloped in hypocrisy and deceitful craft, and their hearts
bound by inner perversity.117
Thus, Calvin counseled in favor of a diligent surveillance of 
one’s own actions and the actions of others; he also endorsed the 
value of the law (both biblical and secular) to guide human behavior 
111. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 240–49 (Robin Waterfield trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1994) (The Allegory of the Cave). 
112. See 1 CALVIN, INSTITUTES, supra note 104, at 286.
113. See id. at 295–96; see also FRANÇOIS WENDEL, CALVIN: THE ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF HIS RELIGIOUS THOUGHT 185 (Philip Mairet trans., 1963). 
114. See WENDEL, supra note 113, at 185.
115. See 1 CALVIN, INSTITUTES, supra note 104, at 295 (“[S]imply to will is of
man; to will ill, of a corrupt nature; to will well, of grace.”). 
116. This distrust extends to our views of ourselves.  See id. at 242 (“Man
by nature inclines to deluded self-admiration.”). 
117. Id. at 340.
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away from its propensity to do wrong.118  Granted, no man could 
even live up to all of the law’s demands, but it was valuable as a 
checking measure nonetheless.  
As Calvin counseled distrust, he also taught that there was no 
hierarchy of humans in the eyes of God.  Every human, by nature, 
is sinful.119  Not even the head of the Church should be insulated 
from the distrust properly trained on all men.120  Yet, Calvin’s 
message did not stop at his emphasis on distrust.  He pointed to the 
font of human hope—the Holy Spirit—and declared that great good 
can be done if the Holy Spirit is permitted to work through 
individuals.121  He reasoned that while the human baseline is sin, 
God’s forgiveness and redemption made salvation and goodness 
real.122  So hope was possible and justified.   
The union of hope and distrust led Calvin to forego despair and 
instead to seek viable means of fixing the Church.123  The problem 
he identified was how to reconstruct the Church on the basis of 
these principles.124  Calvin believed that if he were to “recount the 
vices of church government, [he] may find no end of speaking about 
118. As important as the law is, it cannot single-handedly open a pathway
to redemption and away from sinfulness.  Calvin speaks of the “feebleness of 
the law” in the face of human sinfulness.  Id. at 352.  Human nature makes it 
impossible to fulfill the law’s mandates, and, therefore, “if we look only upon 
the law, we can only be despondent, confused, and despairing in mind, since 
from it all of us are condemned and accursed.”  Id. 
119. See, e.g., WENDEL, supra note 113, at 185.
120. See 2 JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 1138–39
(John T. McNeill ed., Ford Lewis Battles trans., reprt. ed. 2006) [hereinafter 2 
CALVIN, INSTITUTES] (lamenting the lack of restraints on the papacy). 
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. Calvin found most “unbearable” the lack of accountability of the Ro-
man Catholic Church: 
[W]hat is most unbearable of all [is that] they leave no jurisdiction on
earth to control or restrain their lust if they abuse such boundless
power.  Because of the primacy of the Roman Church, they say, no one
has the right to review the judgments of his see.  Likewise: as judge it
will be judged neither by emperor, nor by kings, nor by all the clergy,
nor by the people.
2 CALVIN, INSTITUTES, supra note 120, at 1138. 
124. See generally CALVIN, supra, note 103, at 18–22.
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them,” and therefore he proposed and instituted extensive 
structural changes in the governance of the Church.125  
First, the Roman Church as constituted had to be rejected and 
condemned.126  Calvin described in vivid prose the Roman Church’s 
hubris and its usurpation of power against the people: 
Because of the primacy of the Roman Church, they say, no 
one has the right to review the judgments of this see. 
Likewise: as judge it will be judged neither by emperor, nor 
by kings, nor by all the clergy, nor by the people.  This is 
the very height of imperiousness for one man to set himself 
up as judge of all, and suffer himself to obey the judgment 
of none.  But what if he exercise tyranny over God’s people? 
If he scatter and lay waste Christ’s Kingdom?  If he throw 
the whole church into confusion?  If he turn the pastoral 
office into robbery?  Nay, though he be utterly wicked, he 
denies he is bound to give an accounting.127   
Second, another church must be constructed in its place, one 
with a structure that would guard against the evils of the pre-
Reformation Church.  The “boundless power” of the monarchical 
structure of the Roman Catholic Church was to be transformed 
through the introduction of limited structure.128  Thus, over two 
hundred years before the Framers rejected monarchy as an 
institution unacceptable for the preservation of liberty,129 Calvin 
spoke at length on the tyranny of a monarchy within the church.130 
He rejected the Roman Catholic Church’s claim that the pope was 
the single and universal head of the Christian church.131  In place 
125. See id. at 18.
126. See 2 CALVIN, INSTITUTES, supra note 120, at 1141 (describing Roman
see as “a hundred times more corrupt than it was in the times of Gregory and 
Bernard, though even then it greatly displeased those holy men”). 
127. Id. at 1138.
128. See id.
129. See Adriene Koch, Introduction to JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES
IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at vii, xx (Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (1893); 
see also JOHN WITHERSPOON, ECCLESIASTICAL CHARACTERISTICS (1753), re-
printed in SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 5, at 57, 99–100. 
130. 2 CALVIN, INSTITUTES, supra note 120, 1136, 1138.
131. See id. at 1117–18.  As an interpretive matter, Calvin argues against
the notion of a supreme papacy because such an institution was “utterly un-
known to the ancient fathers.”  Id.  I leave to future articles the fascinating 
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of the monarchical and hierarchical church, Calvin proposed a 
representative structure—one that he considered equally 
applicable to secular governments.132 
b. The Structure of Calvinist Representation
As Calvin saw it, both church leaders and the civil
representatives (known as magistrates) were “ministers” of God, so 
similar analyses might be applied to their relationship to the 
people.  Calvin endorsed representation as a better choice than 
either the monarchy of papism or the direct democracy of ancient 
Athens (a strain of which was later to be found in Calvinist 
Congregationalist churches).133  Representation was a practical 
necessity, he thought; because it permitted the believer to pursue 
his own calling while religious leaders bore the responsibility of 
operating the Church.134  Before prescribing the structures 
necessary to bring the Church back into line with its holy mission, 
Calvin described the governing structure of the “ancient church,”135 
which was his designation for the Church before it was corrupted.   
As the first structural principle of the ancient church, Calvin 
addressed “what kind of men to choose” as ministers and how to 
choose them.136  He wove together an interesting complex that 
included a high standard of responsibility and accountability with 
citizen approval and monitoring of representatives.  
c. Standards, Judgment, and Accountability
In Calvin’s system, church leaders and magistrates held
tremendous power over their charges.  Yet, the position of 
representative did not license tyranny.  On the contrary, it 
burdened representatives with a duty to reach good judgments, 
protect their charges and account to God for every action.  The 
medieval church had employed representation as a means of 
parallels between Calvin’s interpretive strategies and the strategies of the 
originalists of our day. 
132. See id. at 1517–21; JOHN T. MCNEILL, THE HISTORY AND CHARACTER OF
CALVINISM 364 (1954). 
133. See 2 CALVIN, INSTITUTES, supra note 120, at 1519.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 1068.
136. Id. at 1077.
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tethering certain representatives to their districts in order to serve 
the people’s desires,137 in a simple but brilliant move, Calvin turned 
that approach on its head by severing the representative’s ties to 
the people’s desires and making them the higher good.138  
Representatives were not to represent men’s wishes and they were 
“not to tyrannize, but to serve the flock.”139  
Nor were they supposed to serve their own interests, or be 
slaves to the interests of those they served.140  He made them 
servants of God and of God’s charges, the people.141  In this one 
stroke, Calvin turned privilege and power into duty and 
responsibility and thereby revolutionized the structure of 
representation in both the Church and the state.142  Calvin’s 
formulation channeled the potential for licentious and wayward 
behavior, so evident in the pre-Reformed Church, toward a path of 
responsibility.143  Representatives were to be watched by the people 
and tethered to their common good, yet they bore the independent 
duty to make decisions serving the people on behalf of God.144  The 
people were not to be the teleology of the system, nor were their 
perceived desires to be the justification for representative acts.145  
Rather, they were to be the beneficiaries of the system.   
Calvin’s theology of human nature determined his theory of 
representation for both church ministers and magistrates.  Both 
types of representatives were human, and therefore predisposed to 
original sin, but both also were capable of achieving good through 
the possibility of grace.146  Both represented God to the people.147  
137. See BAILYN, supra note 10, at 162–63 (discussing ability of medieval
representatives to seek redress in Parliament while remaining firmly bound to 
local interests and communities through local residency or property require-
ments as qualifications for election, local control over representatives’ wages, 
and strict accountability). 
138. 2 CALVIN, INSTITUTES, supra note 120, at 1520.
139. T. H. L. PARKER, JOHN CALVIN: A BIOGRAPHY 60 (1975).
140. See id. at 59.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See 2 CALVIN, INSTITUTES, supra note 120, at 1519.
144. Id. at 1520.
145. Id. at 1520–21.
146. Id. at 1053.
147. See id. at 1510.
2021] IS THIS A CHRISTIAN NATION? 519 
While the content of their duties differed, structural principles 
devised to cabin the human impulse to sin applied equally to church 
and state.148  Calvin described magistrates as “God’s deputies” and 
“ministers of divine justice” engaged in a “righteous calling.”149  
They were required to exercise “judgment,” and were to be 
accountable for their judgment by “render[ing] account of the 
administration of their charge” to God.150  The magistrate was to 
be a “minister of God” for the people’s “good.”151 
Stringing one requirement after another, Calvin repeatedly 
emphasized the many demands God placed on representatives. 
Acting on behalf of God and in His presence, they needed “great zeal 
for uprightness, for prudence, gentleness, self-control, and for 
innocence.”152  They were required to watch with “care, 
earnestness, and diligence” that they represent the “image of divine 
providence, protection, goodness, benevolence, and justice.”153  
Rulers were to exercise both judgment and justice, which “is to 
receive into safekeeping, to embrace, to protect, vindicate, and free 
the innocent.  But judgment is to withstand the boldness of the 
impious, to repress their violence, to punish their misdeeds.”154 
A magistrate who lived up to his calling held many titles, 
including “father of his country . . . shepherd of his people, guardian 
of peace, protector of righteousness, and avenger of innocence.”155  
On Calvin’s terms, it was no simple task to be a representative but 
it was a role that was far more beneficial for the people.  
In addition to laboring under God’s judgment, ministers of the 
ancient church were held to certain standards of quality and were 
subject to canons governing their behavior.  Calvin noted that the 
ancient church leaders were judged according to how Paul the 
Apostle had lived his life.156  The canons were levied against “evil” 
148. Id. at 1511.
149. Id. at 1491–92. 
150. Id. at 1491. 
151. Id. at 1506.
152. Id. at 1491.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1497.
155. Id. at 1511.
156. See id. at 1509.
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representatives.157  Yet, all of these earthly punishments paled in 
comparison to the judgment God would wield against those who 
abused their charges in His name.  The question Calvin pursued 
was how to craft a governing structure to keep these natural 
impulses to sin in check and thereby disservice the people.158   
d. The Calvinist Form of Government
Calvin saw no necessity for choosing any one particular form of
government from among the long-identified choices—monarchy, 
aristocracy, and democracy—though he did believe an “aristocracy 
bordering on democracy” was least likely to degenerate into a 
corrupted relationship between rulers and the people.159  This was, 
in fact, the form of government he identified from the history of the 
ancient church-independent leadership by those who satisfy certain 
basic criteria coupled with oversight by the people.160  
According to Calvin, each form of government contained the 
seeds of its own destruction, but the one to fear most was direct 
democracy by the people: “The fall from kingdom to tyranny is easy; 
but it is not much more difficult to fall from the rule of the best men 
to the faction of a few; yet it is easiest of all to fall from popular rule 
to sedition.”161  The touchstone of original sin, man’s inherent 
fallibility, led him to conclude that “it is very rare for kings . . . to 
control themselves.”162  Rather, it is “safer and more bearable for a 
number to exercise government, so that they may help one another, 
teach and admonish one another; and if one asserts himself 
unfairly, there may be a number of censors and masters to restrain 
his willfulness,” which was a lesson learned from experience and 
confirmed by the Lord.163  The numbers of an aristocracy, therefore, 
secured a measure of accountability through mutual checking, and 
thereby placed limits on overreaching.  When the number of rulers 
approached the number of citizens though, the system was destined 
to fall into anarchy and disorder.   
157. Id. at 1079.
158. See id. at 1485.
159. Id. at 1493–94 (“The diversity of forms of government.”).
160. See id. at 1494.
161. Id. at 1493.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1493–94.
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Calvin’s general observations about the superiority of an 
aristocracy shaped by democracy, however, were not intended to be 
rigid prescriptions.  It was appropriate that the world would include 
“various kinds of government” because a particular country’s needs 
depended on its circumstances.164  “For as elements cohere only in 
unequal proportion, so countries are best held together according to 
their own particular inequality.”165  Fitting schemes of governance 
to a country’s character required deliberation.166  
God would not mandate a single governing structure any more 
than he would “prescribe in detail” church organization.167  Rather, 
church and state government were to be molded to the needs of the 
moment.168  This meant that any particular structure was 
constructed by fallible man but guided by “general rules” laid down 
by God.169  Accordingly, Calvin criticized his own blueprint for 
church reform, the Institutes, three years after its first publication: 
he found the work lacking in depth and inadequate in developing 
certain themes.170  As he watched his intended structure unfold in 
Geneva, he successively amended the Institutes to reflect lessons 
learned.  In this sense, building a governing structure for Calvin 
was an experimental task, based to be sure on general principles 
from God, but informed by mortal experience.   
This experimental approach served Calvin’s goal of 
reconstructing without necessarily displacing the church; it yielded 
a system that was both stable and flexible.  On the one hand, 
certain structures were capable of deterring abuses of power in 
particular eras, but on the other hand, a structure could outlive its 
usefulness.  Calvin’s reformation turned out to be not a one-time 
task, but rather a work in progress requiring vigilance.  His 
openness to error, failure, and contingency, combined with a 
commitment to deterring abuses, is crucial to an understanding of 
his systematic political theology and of how its prescriptions 
radically differ from those of the people normally cited as 
164. Id. at 1494.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 1493–94.
167. Id. at 1208; see also WENDEL, supra note 113, at 302–03.
168. See WENDEL, supra note 113, at 302–03.
169. 2 CALVIN, INSTITUTES, supra note 120, at 1208.
170. See PARKER, supra note 139, at 50.
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influencing the constitution’s framing—Locke, Hobbes, and Burke, 
especially.  By comparison, their theories fail to reconcile the 
inevitability of flow performance with a commitment to high ideals. 
e. The Office of Representative
Calvin did not reject every tenet of the Catholic structure.
Drawing from Catholic teachings regarding the infallibility of the 
often-sinning popes, Calvin distinguished the office from its holder: 
the office was the seat of power, not the individual sitting in it. 171 
There were four offices: ministers (or pastors), teachers (or doctors), 
elders, and deacons.172  The primary leader of the church and 
representative of God was the minister, who was chosen by other 
ministers and the Magistracy (the secular ruler of Geneva), but 
whose nomination was presented to the people for their consent.173 
f. The People
The people, as Calvin saw them, were inevitably players in the
game of representation, but they were not trustworthy players.  Nor 
were their impulses a focal point of the game.  Calvin did not 
identify a right of the people to elect their church leaders, but he 
did approve of election in the ancient church and praised the 
practice of promoting leaders who had been observed by the people 
during their term of representation.174  According to Calvin, the 
consent of the people was regularly sought regarding church 
leaders in the ancient church.175  Some promotions within the 
church were made without this consent but only after the subject 
had been “for many years examin[ed] under the eyes of the 
people.”176  Bishops of the ancient church were precluded from 
creating a dynasty by the requirement that their selection of 
successors be validated by the people’s approval, a check on church 
leaders long left behind by the time of the Reformation.177  This 
much involvement by the people was sufficient according to Calvin; 
171. Id. at 58.
172. See WENDEL, supra note 113, at 76–78; PARKER, supra note 139, at 82.
173. See WENDEL, supra note 113, at 76.
174. 2 CALVIN, INSTITUTES, supra note 120, at 1065.
175. Id. at 1078.
176. Id. at 1079.
177. Id.
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the clergy and officials could choose rulers, and the people could 
approve that choice.178  For Calvin, more involvement would be a 
mistake.  
Calvin commended neither self-rule nor rule by the people at 
any level.  He accused the people of following “foolish desires” and 
of being a “heedless multitude.”179  Yet he considered their 
participation, through oversight and especially during worship, to 
be essential; the people could provide a vital check on their leaders 
but were not necessarily a source of wisdom.180   
Although it was appropriate for the people to elect—and 
necessary for them to monitor— their leaders, Calvin rejected the 
notion of a crowd gathering to choose a church leader.181  Election 
rather should be orderly and according to procedures.182  It should 
also be open: ordinations took place at appointed times so as to keep 
any candidate from creeping in secretly “without the consent of the 
believers.”183 
One of the cornerstones of Calvin’s systematic theology and 
political philosophy was the pairing of liberty and 
representation.184  Liberty, or a degree of autonomy for the people, 
was essential to keeping representatives accountable to a higher 
good.185  Calvin conceived not a pure negative liberty, but rather 
liberty within structured order.186  The people needed sufficient 
autonomy not just to serve their own ends but also to beware of a 
representative’s actions.187  The liberty Calvin envisioned made the 
people responsible for oversight, which kept representation from 
turning into tyranny.188  In a properly functioning representative 
system, the people were freed to fulfill God’s distinctive calling for 
each of them.   
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See PARKER, supra note 139, at 86.
181. 2 CALVIN, INSTITUTES, supra note 120, at 1077–78.
182. Id. at 1080.
183. Id. at 1079.
184. Id. at 1493–94 n.21.
185. See id. at 1495.
186. See id. at 1520.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 1518.
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By liberty, Calvin meant not anarchy or licentiousness, but 
rather their opposite.189  “[N]o kind of government is more happy 
than one where freedom is regulated with becoming 
moderation.”190  Far from a license to misbehave, liberty-like 
representation brought with it a heavy responsibility.  Calvin did 
not remake the Church in toto, he retained the notion of the 
Church’s (and the civil government’s) power to demand obedience 
in virtually all circumstances.191  He counseled general—some 
might say extreme—obedience to authority.192  In most 
circumstances, the people owed fealty to the office created by God, 
even if that office was held by evil rulers.  Only where the believer’s 
relationship to God was seriously endangered were the people, 
through their magistrates, permitted to resist or rebel.193  Calvin 
saw just that sort of crisis in the pre-Reformation Catholic Church, 
whose evil was the tyranny of entrenched institutions and of 
bureaucrats indifferent to the needs of the individuals God charged 
them to serve.194   
Under Calvin’s reasoning, the people did not have the authority 
to disobey bad rulers or to rebel against them.  Such power was a 
more radical change in Church governance at the time than even 
Calvin could envision.  Corrupt or tyrannical rulers were in fact the 
judgment by God rendered against the people for their own bad 
acts.195  This reveals a tension in Calvin’s system: he approved of 
the people watching over their rulers to prevent tyranny, but 
assigned them no accountability for stern abuses of power.196  His 
structure assigned value to accountability and responsibility, yet it 
implicitly permitted irresponsibility.  It would take John Knox, the 
leader of the Scottish Reformation, to assign the people an active 
role in checking their leaders’ abuses of power.   
189. See id. at 1494 n.21 (quoting sermons in which Calvin states that
“[n]othing is more desirable than liberty,” and liberty is an “inestimable good”). 
190. Id.
191. See id. at 1493–94.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 1518.
194. See id. at 1512, 1518.
195. See id. at 1512.
196. See id.
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2. John Knox and the Role of the People in Checking Their Rulers
While Calvin’s theory left the people subject to a tyrannical
ruler in all but the most extreme circumstances, Scottish reformer 
John Knox (1514–1572) is most remembered for advocating the 
people’s active resistance to corrupt rulers.197  This was a 
remarkable position for someone to take at the time and Knox did 
not begin from it, but reached it only once he was convinced that 
the normal channels of power could not save Scotland from the 
Catholic—and therefore idolatrous—Queen Mary.198  Knox’s 
searing criticism of the Catholic Church led Scotland’s nobility and 
upper class to turn away from the Church and toward Calvin’s 
reformed Church.199  
Knox, building on Calvin, reasoned that the people had a duty 
to obey their rulers in most circumstances, but he added a 
concomitant duty to check rulers who went astray200: the office was 
distinct from the office holder, and the officeholder could be held to 
the requirements of the office.201  Knox said that “the ordinance of 
God, and the power giffin unto man, is one thing, and the persone 
clad with the power or with the authoritie, is an[y] [o]ther [. . .] that 
the Prince may be resistit, and yit the ordinance of God nocht 
violatit, is evident.”202  The right of the people to resist corrupt 
rulers is so evident, it might seem now, as to demonstrate how much 
Knox has come to inform our political common sense.  But in the 
sixteenth century, this notion was radical and Knox made that 
evident through reason that defied the official common wisdom of 
the day.  Although Knox’s theory encouraged the common people to 
attack corrupt rulers through ordinary channels of power such as 
197. See Jane E.A. Dawson, Trumpeting Resistance: Christopher Goodman
and John Knox, in JOHN KNOX AND THE BRITISH REFORMATIONS 131, 140 (Roger 
A. Mason ed., 1998).
198. See id. at 144.
199. See id. at 145.
200. See Robert M. Healey, John Knox’s “History”: A “Compleat” Sermon on
Christian Duty, 61 CHURCH HIST. 319, 322–23 (1992). 
201. See Dawson, supra note 197, at 140.  Knox’s contemporary Christopher
Goodman also advocated disobedience to corrupt monarchs by the people.  See 
generally id. 
202. Id. at 139 (quoting 4 JOHN KNOX, THE HISTORIE OF THE REFORMATIOUN 
OF RELIGIOUN IN THE REALM OF SCOTLAND (1566), reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF
JOHN KNOX 261, 435–36 (David Laing ed., 1848)). 
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the magistrates Calvin identified, it also permitted and even 
obligated them to disobey an “idolatrous” monarch—with or 
without sympathetic authorities in tow.203  This duty to disobey 
was coupled with an obligation on the part of the people to monitor 
their leaders in the interest of the larger polity.  If one saw a leader 
departing from the righteous path, one was required to warn of the 
dangers likely to follow.  
Knox lived his own theory.  He felt duty-bound to criticize plans 
for Queen Mary to enter into a Catholic marriage, and to criticize 
her Catholic practices, despite the fact that he was a commoner: 
“Yea, Madam, to me it appertains no less to forewarn of such things 
as may hurt [the commonwealth], if I foresee them, than it does to 
any of the Nobility.”204 
Like Calvin, Knox did not believe that the people were 
inherently better than their rulers.  His conception of their duty to 
watch and judge their rulers rested not at all on any such 
superiority.  To the contrary, he considered them the “rascal 
multitude,”205 and was deeply disappointed by the Scots’ 
willingness to tolerate Queen Mary’s Catholicism.206  Knox believed 
that the people had no inherent right to rule themselves, but rather 
a God-given duty to ensure that those ruling them ruled 
appropriately.207  The concept of this duty—to monitor and check 
wayward rulers—was Knox’s contribution to reformation theology, 
to structural political theory, and eventually to United States 
constitutional theory.  
These contributions bore fruit in the Reverend John 
Witherspoon’s full-throttle support for the colonies’ revolutionary 
separation from England.  Unlike Calvin’s theories, those of Knox 
would justify rejecting King George III rather than suffering his 
tyranny.  A Calvinist raised in Scotland, such as Witherspoon, was 
poised to know the difference—and make a difference with it.  
Calvin saw a corrupt church and diagnosed its problem with a 
radical new theory.  There was no way to guarantee that church 
203. See Healey, supra note 200, at 322–33.
204. Id. at 326 (quoting KNOX, supra note 202, at 388).
205. Kenneth Lee Cuthbertson, “I Have Been Fighting Satan”: John Knox
and the Quest for Godly Liberation in Sixteenth Century Britain (unpublished 
dissertation, Univ. Iowa 1992) (on file with author). 
206. See Healey, supra note 200, at 327.
207. See id. at 328.
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leaders would not abuse their powers.  Thus, the solution lay in 
constructing a better system to govern their impulses, a system that 
would encourage virtue and discourage sin: representation in the 
service of God and the higher good.  No such system would ever 
generate perfect results, but a particular structure at a particular 
time could deter some of the inevitable abuses of power.  By 
building his system on the assumption of sin, Calvin eschewed 
idealism and any revolution that would promise permanent good 
government.  Instead, he counseled reform.  His conviction that 
people holding power would abuse it led him to conclude that reform 
was a never-ending project.   
Calvin’s paradoxical marriage of sin and grace, of despair and 
hope, is a move that reveals both Thomas Hobbes’ (1588–1679) 
pessimism and John Locke’s (1632–1704) Enlightenment optimism 
as oversimplifications.  Hobbes and Locke are rightly credited with 
a measure of influence on the shape of representation in the United 
States, and this Article does not intend to belittle their influence. 
Their views have been the focus, though for many an analysis that 
has left out the Calvinist influences that were also present.  This 
Article risks an over-emphasis on Reformation theology but does so 
for the purpose of counterbalancing the general wisdom that 
excludes theology from the sources employed by the Framers as 
they crafted the Constitution’s structure.  Both Hobbes and Locke 
directly addressed the relationship between the people and their 
governors; both have been credited as shaping the Framers’ 
understanding of representation.  But neither’s work explains the 
constitutional system quite as well as Calvin’s and Knox’s.  
Hobbes believed so deeply in the ineradicable shortcomings of 
humankind that he opposed democracy and favored a benevolent 
monarchical dictatorship.208  Representation could not work, 
according to Hobbes, because there were too few to be trusted with 
such power so the best to be achieved was rule by a single dictator 
who chose to treat the people fairly and beneficently.209  While the 
instinct of distrust can be found in the Constitution, Hobbes’s 
pessimism about representative forms of government cannot.  
208. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 113 (1651).
209. See id. at 144.
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Locke, in his Second Treatise on Government, opened with the 
proposition that all men begin in a “state of nature.”210  He argued 
further that they formed a contract among equals to create civil 
society and are governed by natural law, which is accessible by 
human reason.211  As he saw it, legislators are (because of their 
close relation to the people) less likely to abuse their powers than 
an executive is.212  This theory fits rather nicely with the Articles 
of Confederation of government instituted in the United States 
following the Revolution, but is at odds with the Framers’ 
observations at the Constitutional Convention.  There, they 
repeatedly identified the legislature as the most dangerous branch 
of the government.213  Locke lacks the thorough distrust that 
undergirded Calvin’s and the Framers’ governing theories.  
Attention to Calvin’s views also reveals Edmund Burke (1729–
1797) to be unfairly credited as a primary or singular intellectual 
ancestor of our Constitution’s system of representation.  Burke, 
raised as a Protestant in Ireland, shared Calvin’s belief in the 
impossibility of perfecting human nature.214  Unlike Calvin, 
however, he did not advocate experimenting with temporally-
tailored, polity-specific forms of government.  Rather, he insisted 
210. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 4–5 (Maestro Re-
prints 2012) (1690). 
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See, e.g., MADISON, supra note 129, at 322-23 (statement of Governeur
Morris) (“It is necessary then that the Executive Magistrate should be the 
guardian of the people, even of the lower classes, ag[ainst] Legislative tyranny, 
against the Great Y the wealthy who in the course of things will necessarily 
compose the Legislative body.  Wealth tends to corrupt the mind & to nourish 
its love of power, and then to stimulate it to oppression” (footnote omitted)). 
214. According to Burke, “[p]olitics ought to be adjusted, not to human rea-
sonings, but to human nature; of which the reason is but a part, and by no 
means the greatest part.”  EDMUND BURKE, OBSERVATIONS ON A LATE 
PUBLICATION, INTITULED, “THE PRESENT STATE OF THE NATION” (1769), reprinted 
in 1 THE WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE 185, 280 (1902).  In politics, due to the 
weaknesses of human nature, “the greater the power the more dangerous the 
abuse.”  See Edmund Burke, Speech on the Motions Made in the House of Com-
mons Relative to the Middlesex Election (Feb. 7, 1771), in 7 THE WORKS OF THE 
RIGHT HONORABLE EDMUND BURKE 59, 62 (rev. ed. 1866).  Therefore, “[w]hen 
bad men combine, the good must associate; else they will fall one by one, an 
unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible struggle.”  EDMUND BURKE, THOUGHTS ON
THE CAUSE OF THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS (1770), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF
EDMUND BURKE, supra, at 306, 372. 
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that the structures of the past were the only ones worthy of trust.215  
He was a traditionalist, not a reformer.  
Calvin, in contrast, refused to give the past any honorary 
status.  He sought to preserve the Church, not because it already 
existed, but rather because it must exist.  By the sixteenth century, 
the Church’s traditions were an embarrassment, a mockery of the 
true Church.  Calvin’s prescription was to find the right structure 
for the times and to assume that it may have to be adjusted in the 
future.  This allowed the structure of the church and the civil 
government to follow new paths as well as old.  
Calvin’s theories alone, however, cannot explain the full impact 
of Reformation theology on the Framing of the Constitution.  Calvin 
locked himself into a position that required the people to suffer bad 
leaders, a position that would have counseled against the 
Revolutionary War and the Declaration of Independence.  While 
structure could be altered, those holding particular offices appear 
inviolate in his scheme.  Nevertheless, his acknowledgment that 
even church leaders could accomplish evil was a new and liberating 
idea, but it left his followers in the peculiar position of being 
powerless to eradicate evil once they had identified it.  Knox added 
the crucial notion that the people may overthrow tyrannical 
leaders.   
Neither Calvin nor Knox believed in direct rule by the people, 
but Knox added citizen resistance to Calvin’s prescription of 
citizen’s observation.  Each prescribed radical moves based on 
radical theories, and they found their way into the Constitution via 
the influence of Reverend John Witherspoon and the Presbyterian 
Church in Scotland and the states.  
III. THE CALVINIST EDUCATION OF THE FRAMERS
A. Witherspoon
Centuries after it was drafted, the United States Constitution
has been touted as a “model” for democratic governance.  Setting 
aside the oft-justified charges of hubris and imperialism, the claim 
can be justified empirically by the success of the Constitution in 
establishing order and liberty for many years.  The notion of the 
215. See Peter Berkowitz, Burke Between Liberty and Tradition, HOOVER 
INST. (Dec. 1, 2012), https://www.hoover.org/research/burke-between-liberty-
and-tradition [https://perma.cc/QR68-AJWE]. 
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Constitution as a “model framework” was not a view held by the 
Framers or the influential Reverend John Witherspoon.216  He 
would have rejected the very idea of a “model constitution” and 
taught that constitutions must be fit to a people.  To Witherspoon, 
a constitution has a finite lifespan:   
Shall we live without government because every 
constitution has its old age and its period?  Because we 
know that we shall die, shall we take no pains to preserve 
or lengthen life?  Nay, rather “it only requires the more 
watchful attention to settle government upon the best 
principles and in the wisest manner that it may last as long 
as the nature of things will admit.”217  
The Framers, acutely aware of their own fallibility and the likely 
shortcomings of the product they forwarded to Congress, hoped for 
little more than that the system would, in fact, run in the states.  
Madison himself despaired that it might not succeed.218  
Witherspoon taught him and others to construct a constitution the 
way a creative clockmaker would craft a clock; bringing together 
various cogs and wheels of government into a system.219  Thus, a 
machine custom-built for the times and the people was to be 
constructed, and its one good was the common good.  
The Reverend John Witherspoon lectured his students—who 
included Framers James Madison, David Bready, William R. Davie, 
Jonathan Dayton, and William Churchill Houston—on the different 
types of government under the heading, Lectures on Moral 
Philosophy.220  But by moral philosophy, he did not mean a 
philosophy, which is the product of reason, does not contradict or 
displace religion but rather is “coincident with the word of God.”221  
Reason is a God-given tool for divining moral philosophy given by 
216. See id.
217. COLLINS, supra note 23, at 9 (quoting Witherspoon).
218. James Madison and the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787,
LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/collections/james-madison-papers/articles-
and-essays/james-madison-and-the-federal-constitutional-convention-of-1787/ 
[perma.cc/S32B-P3DP] (last visited Apr. 18, 2021). 
219. See Miller, supra note 10, at 37.
220. See id. at 26, 34.
221. See JOHN WITHERSPOON, LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1800), re-
printed in SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 5, at 152, 152–53 (“Scripture is per-
fectly agreeable to sound philosophy. . . .”). 
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God, which is needed because scripture does not “teach us 
everything.”222  Witherspoon criticized the influential Scotsman 
Frances Hutcheson, who believed that all knowledge comes from 
revelation.223  On his terms, reason and judgment were 
indispensable elements of the sort of moral decision making needed 
for government making.224 
Witherspoon advocated Calvin’s experimental approach to 
structuring government, and he preached a responsibility to apply 
reason to determine the best government for a particular era and 
people.  For Witherspoon, governments had their time: when a 
governing structure ceased to serve the common good, it was time 
to craft a new one to fit the current circumstances and needs of the 
people.225  Human fallibility kept all structures from perfection, but 
human reason could work to reform them.  Witherspoon taught his 
students that the four elements of a good government are:  
(1) wisdom to plan proper measures for the public good; (2)
fidelity to have nothing but the public interest in view; (3)
secrecy, expedition, and dispatch in carrying measures into
execution; and, (4) unity and concord, or that one branch of
the government may not impede or be a hindrance to
another.226
The first two elements emphasize that the goal of good 
government is to serve the public good.227  The latter two stress 
that pragmatic measures are necessary to achieve that goal.228  
Following Calvin, Witherspoon identified the three classic 
structures of government as monarchy, democracy, and 
aristocracy.229  These were the primary building blocks out of which 
men could structure governments.  Again, following Calvin, he 
believed that the same precepts could be applied to church or 
222. Id. at 153.
223. See Miller, supra note 10, at 36.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 37.
226. WITHERSPOON, supra note 221, at 201.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. Id. at 200.
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government organization, because the fundamental starting point 
for both was original sin and the need to deter sin.230   
Each of the classic forms was reflected in one of the post-
Reformation Protestant structures.  The Episcopal structure, or 
government by bishops, corresponded to the monarchical 
structure.231  The Congregationalist structure, or government by 
the masses, corresponded to democracy.232  And the Presbyterian 
structure, or government by duly elected representatives, 
corresponded to rule by an aristocracy.233  All three church orders 
were evident in the colonies each with its own particular 
strongholds, and each present at the Constitutional Convention.234 
Witherspoon echoed Calvin’s counsel in the Institutes that 
nations need not choose only one form, and that the “simple forms” 
could be combined “in equal or in different proportions.”235  No 
single simple form of government was capable of achieving wisdom, 
fidelity to the public interest, efficiency, and community.  Rather, 
the primary elements of each must be combined and/or modified for 
a people at a particular time.  Witherspoon’s evenhanded analysis 
invited his students to experiment this way and to analyze any form 
of government as a complex machine composed of individual 
mechanisms.  
Each form—by itself—had its strengths and its weaknesses, 
according to Witherspoon.  He defined monarchy as a system whose 
“supreme power is vested in a single person,”236 and gave it high 
marks for efficiency but low marks for offering no guarantee of 
“wisdom or goodness.”237  It was “another name for tyranny, where 
the arbitrary will of one capricious man disposes of the lives and 
230. See WITHERSPOON, supra note 5, at 130 n.1.
231. BROWN, supra note 51, at 6.
232. See id.
233. See id. at 6–7.
234. See, e.g., WILLIAM WARREN SWEET, RELIGION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
AMERICAN CULTURE, 1765–1840 85 (1952) (stating that nineteen of the Fram-
ers were Episcopalians, eight Congregationalists, seven Presbyterians, two Ro-
man Catholics, two Quakers, one Methodist, and one Dutch Reformed).  My 
research indicates that there were at least seventeen who were influenced by 
Presbyterianism (including James Wilson, who converted to Anglicanism later 
in life).  See supra notes 13–19 and accompanying text. 
235. WITHERSPOON, supra note 221, at 201.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 202.
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properties of all ranks.”238  Aristocracy, or the employ of persons of 
the “first rank” to govern, exceeded the other two forms in wisdom 
but failed to ensure fidelity to the people’s interest or unity.239  It 
“always ma[de] vassals of the inferior ranks.”240  Democracy was 
better than either monarchy or aristocracy in ensuring fidelity to 
the public good, but it failed to secure wisdom and community, and, 
most particularly, it lacked efficiency.241  “Pure democracy,” or 
direct rule by the people, could not last for long, because it was 
“subject to [the] caprice and the madness of popular rage.”242  Nor 
were the people a particularly reliable check on the their leaders’ 
abuses of power.  The people tended to trust their leaders with “such 
power” that their leaders could make the people serve their 
whims.243  In short, “none of the simple forms [of government] are 
favorable to [liberty].”244  Witherspoon thus led his students to the 
conclusion that every form of good government “must be 
complex.”245 
Witherspoon offered a three-element prescription for crafting 
good governments, each element of which appeared to some degree 
at the Constitutional Convention.  First, he preached distrust of 
human motives, “[f]or all have sinned and come short of the glory 
of God.”246  People should assume that all rulers would be tempted 
to abuse their powers.247  This was not a pessimistic view: it 
reflected the Calvinist view that virtuous rulers could appear, but 
that one should expect all to be tempted to forsake virtue for power.  





242. Id. at 202–03.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 202.
245. Id. at 203.
246. 1 JOHN WITHERSPOON, THE WORKS OF THE REV. JOHN WITHERSPOON
267–68 (2d ed. 1802) (quoting Romans 3:23). 
247. See WITHERSPOON, supra note 221, at 204.
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expect all to be tempted to forsake virtue for power.  Thus, any form 
of government could produce virtue and happiness or tyranny.248 
Second, liberty (his synonym—like Calvin’s—for good 
government) was achievable if the various elements of government 
were balanced so that one would check another.249  In other words, 
no one part of the government should be permitted to hold 
overweening power.  Each should have just enough power to carry 
out its duties in the interest of the public good—and no more.  This 
is what he called the “doctrine of the Balance of Power.”250 
Third, these mutually balanced elements should be 
interdependent to some degree so as not to whirl away into their 
own orbits.251  There must be some necessity binding the otherwise 
independent forces together.  
All the forms of government might produce virtue and 
happiness, but the securing liberty for all required a system that 
built in distrust and hope.  The resulting system aims for balance 
and independence to achieve “the protection of liberty.”252  And why 
was liberty so precious?  Because it alone “put in motion all the 
human powers.”253  It was the “nurse of riches, literature, and 
heroism,”254 the pathway to cultural and individual riches.   
Following Calvin’s and Knox’s prescriptions, Witherspoon did 
not view self-government as a worthy goal.  Ordered liberty was the 
better goal and could be achieved only through the right structure 
of government.255  Witherspoon did not elaborate on why these 
three elements—riches, literature, and heroism¾are worthy goals 
of good government; he simply stated them.  But Calvinist theory 
can help to explain them as signs of success.  For the Calvinist, who 
can obtain no guarantee in this life of being one of God’s favored, 
248. See id. at 205.  Witherspoon was quite comfortable bringing together
apparent opposites—like distrust and hope—and conceding the paradox.  See 
also NOLL, supra note 18, at 47. 
249. See WITHERSPOON, supra note 221, at 203.
250. See COLLINS, supra note 23, at 9–10.
251. WITHERSPOON, supra note 221, at 203.
252. Id. at 191.
253. Id. at 205.
254. Id.
255. See id. at 203.
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earthly success is a sign of being chosen.256  The governmental 
structure crafted by Witherspoon implied a society where visible 
success, and possibly salvation, would be more likely.  His structure 
would have attracted the Calvinist by subtly improving the odds of 
salvation.   
In addition to identifying for his students the building blocks 
of government and suggesting how they should be combined, 
Witherspoon also taught them a pragmatic approach to the problem 
of crafting a new government.  He rejected the notion that one ought 
to “reason downward upon metaphysical principles.”257  Counseling 
instead that it was “safer” to reason by “trac[ing] facts upwards.”258  
The man who would formulate good government was not 
contemplating the Platonic Forms but rather an experimental 
observer, who should take into account the facts before him and 
take seriously the lessons of the past.259  Following Calvin, 
Witherspoon urged movement away from the notion of an ideal 
government and crystalline metaphysical concepts, and toward 
pragmatic solutions to experienced problems.260  The forms of 
government were not vapid structures to be brought together by 
dilettantes with no reference to political realities.  To the contrary, 
they required all of one’s reason—both practical and theoretical.   
The Framers were charged with the job of “fixing” the Articles 
of Confederation, and the most important among them—James 
Madison and James Wilson—approached their task as one of 
reformation, not revolution.  Witherspoon’s lectures foreshadowed 
that approach by inculcating a Calvinist understanding of 
governments as experimental complexes of basic building blocks.  
For the United States, as for the Presbyterian Church, 
Witherspoon advocated a system of representation that fell between 
256. See Anthony Giddens, Introduction to MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT
ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM, at vii, xii–xiii (Routledge Classics 2001) 
(1930). 
257. See WITHERSPOON, supra note 221, at 229.
258. Id.  Given his predilection for a pragmatic approach, it may not come
as a surprise that Witherspoon was widely respected as a man of uncommonly 
“good sense” who placed his emphasis on the “ability of intuition to uncover the 
truth.”  NOLL, supra note 18, at 28–29, 41. 
259. See id. at 46, 47.
260. With this move, Witherspoon is credited with turning Princeton away
from the influence of Jonathan Edwards, who heavily influenced Yale.  See id. 
at 44–45. 
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an aristocracy and a democracy.  He believed the failure of the 
Articles of Confederation argued in favor of in a system in which 
the people did not rule but rather delegated their authority to 
representatives who were accountable to them to pursue the 
common good.261  This system created a “double duty . . . that of the 
people who choose their rulers, and that of the representatives to 
whom is entrusted the exercise of this delegated authority.”262 
Representatives were to be trustees of the people’s interest with 
independent authority to reach judgments in their service.263  
This representative system was premised on the necessity of 
choosing representatives who were virtuous.  Witherspoon declared 
that “[t]he people must choose men of high principles” in order for 
the system to achieve certain good ends: “whatsoever state among 
us shall continue to make piety and virtue the standard of public 
honor, will enjoy the greatest inward peace, the greatest national 
happiness, and in every outward conflict will discover the greatest 
constitutional strength.”264  
B. Jonathan Edwards
An Article claiming a preeminent role for John Witherspoon in
the constitutional calculus cannot ignore the fact that there was a 
more respected and more brilliant Calvinist at the time: Jonathan 
Edwards.  Edwards is credited with being the greatest Calvinist 
theologian of his time, and perhaps in American history.265  
Calvinist theology yielded two church structures in the states: 
the Presbyterian representative systems and the Congregationalist 
democracies.  Witherspoon was the leader of the former, while 
Edwards served the same role for the latter,266 which was the 
branch of Calvinism that gave lip service to rule by the people 
(though in practice their church governance was not as purely 
261. See Terence S. Morrow, Common Sense Deliberative Practice: John
Witherspoon, James Madison, and the U.S. Constitution, 29 RHETORIC SOC’Y Q. 
25, 34 (1999). 
262. COLLINS, supra note 23, at 128.
263. See id.
264. Id. at 128–29.
265. See E. BROOKS HOLIFIELD, THEOLOGY IN AMERICA 102–27 (2003).
266. See id. (describing Edwards’s theology and influence); NOLL, supra
note 18, at 29–31, 43–47 (describing Witherspoon’s influence and refutation of 
Edwards). 
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democratic as their name would imply).267  Despite Edwards’s 
unquestioned brilliance, there is no evidence that his ideas were 
influential at the Constitutional Convention.  Unlike Witherspoon, 
he did not train any of the Framers.268  Edwards might have had 
the chance to carry the day at the Constitutional Convention, and 
his influence might have had the chance to produce a different, 
more democratic system, had he been able to serve longer as 
President of the College of New Jersey, a position characterized as 
“the functional leadership of American Calvinism.”269  But after 
being appointed in January of 1758, he died of smallpox a few 
months later without having left a lasting mark on the College.270  
Witherspoon eventually replaced him, serving from 1768 until 
1794, and steered the school more securely toward Presbyterian 
and traditional Calvinist precepts.271   
As Calvinists, Edwards and Witherspoon shared some core 
theological tenets, especially the consuming focus on original sin.  
There are marked differences in emphasis, however, where their 
theories reach questions of church or government organization.  
Those differences are worth considering here because they bring 
into focus the distinction between the Constitution that was 
enacted (a republican structure) and the one that so many of our 
most distinguished constitutional law experts believe was enacted 
(one rooted in the value of self-rule).272  
267. See James F. Cooper, Jr., Higher Law, Free Consent, Limited Author-
ity: Church Government and Political Culture in Seventeenth-Century Massa-
chusetts, 69 NEW ENG. Q. 201, 205 (1996) (describing the power of ministers in 
church business). 
268. See generally PERRY MILLER, JONATHAN EDWARDS (1965).
269. ALAN HEIMERT, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN MIND 155 (1966).
270. See Francis L. Broderick, Pulpit, Physics, and Politics: The Curriculum
of the College of New Jersey, 1746–1794, 6 WM. & MARY Q. 42, 59-68 (1949). 
271. See M.X. LESSER, JONATHAN EDWARDS 19-20 (1988).
272. Compare Mark Noll, What Has Been Distinctly American About Amer-
ican Presbyterians?, 84 J. Presbyterian Hist. 6, 6 (2006) (describing Presbyter-
ian church government as “combin[ing] substantial elements of both aristoc-
racy and democracy” of “government by elders in a layered series of 
courts¾representatives acting on behalf of God’s people”), with Cooper, supra 
note 267, at 205–06 (describing Congregationalist church government as 
mainly guided and controlled by ministers but with some limitations by the 
laity to recall errant leaders). 
538 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.26:495 
Edwards was educated at Yale and served as a minister for 
most of his life.273  Like all true Calvinists, he believed that men 
“always have a tendency to sin,” and he built his theology around 
that premise.274  The reality of original sin and the sinfulness of 
men over time undermined the facile optimism of the 
Enlightenment theorists, who had placed too much trust in the 
capacity of human reason.  Rulers, like all others, were likely to 
abuse their powers. 275 
Sounding themes from Calvin and Knox respectively, Edwards 
counseled the people to scrutinize and criticize “the management of 
public affairs, and the duty of the legislature, and those that are at 
the head of the administration.”276  From his pulpit he inveighed 
against local politicians, saying that too many of their kind operate 
only “to enrich themselves, or to become great, and to advance 
themselves on the spoils of others.”277  On these points, he was in 
harmony with Witherspoon.  
As a Congregationalist, however, Edwards had a theology and 
philosophy tending more toward consensus or community-based 
decision-making than the representative democracy chose by the 
Framers and the Presbyterian Church.  He sought “the harmonious 
cooperation of all men” in the public sphere.278  For him, 
“community is a defining character of reality,”279 but bare 
democracy was untenable because the church required some 
structure to achieve cooperation and organization.   
273. See LESSER, supra note 271, at 25–27.
274. ROBERT W. JENSON, AMERICA’S THEOLOGIAN: A RECOMMENDATION OF
JONATHAN EDWARDS 145 (1988); see also JONATHAN EDWARDS, ORIGINAL SIN 108 
(Clyde A. Holbrook ed., Yale Univ. Press 1970) (1758). 
275. See JONATHAN EDWARDS, The Day of Judgment (Dec. 1729), in 14 THE
WORKS OF JONATHAN EDWARDS: SERMONS AND DISCOURSES, 1723–1729, at 506, 
514–15 (Kenneth P. Minkema ed., 1997) (“There are many of the kings and 
great men that don’t suitably acknowledge the God that is above them, but 
seem to look upon themselves as supreme, and tyrannize over mankind as if 
they were accountable to no other.”). 
276. JONATHAN EDWARDS, THOUGHTS ON THE REVIVAL OF RELIGION IN NEW
ENGLAND (1740), reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OF PRESIDENT EDWARDS 273, 275 
(1881).  
277. JONATHAN EDWARDS, CHARITY AND ITS FRUITS: OR, CHRISTIAN LOVE AS
MANIFESTED IN THE HEART AND LIFE 82 (Tyron Edwards ed., Alacrity Press pa-
perback ed. 2015) (1852) (an originally unpublished sermon delivered in 1738). 
278. HEIMERT, supra note 269, at 155.
279. JENSON, supra note 274, at 176.
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Even though he did not advocate direct democracy, or rule by 
the people, he saw in true believers a rightful aristocracy.  Edwards 
lost his pulpit in an attempt to elevate true believers as a class 
reaching beyond church elders and community leaders and over all 
others.280  He argued that only the saints here on earth should 
receive communion, simultaneously reducing the numbers of those 
who might take communion but increasing, as a class, the stature 
of those who did.281  Thus, his inclination to community was toward 
a privileged community not the general community.  Moreover, his 
theories were more suited to the Church than civil government, 
unlike Calvin’s and Witherspoon’s.  
Though he was a Calvinist, Edwards eschewed Calvin’s and 
Witherspoon’s chief focus on power.  He placed love at the fulcrum 
of belief and theology.282  And while this may have counted as a 
step forward for theology, it firmly settled him outside the bounds 
of plausible constitutional influence, since the Constitution’s 
decided focus is power.  Nor did Edwards explicitly embrace the 
experiment, context-dependent approach to crafting government 
charted by Calvin and later embraced by Witherspoon and the 
Framers.  While the Constitution’s primary focus on the division 
and distribution of power can be explained by reference to 
Calvinism, it is not to the Calvinism of Jonathan Edwards. 
Since Calvin’s and Knox’s reformation approaches to 
government were brought to the college classroom and to influential 
Framers such as James Madison through the Reverend John 
Witherspoon it is no accident that United States governmental 
structure bears strong similarities to the Presbyterian Church’s 
governmental structure.  This link between Reformation political 
theory and the Framers is probative on the question of the Framers’ 
choice of a governmental structure—it serves to test, try, and prove 
this Article’s theory of why we have the representational scheme 
we do and how its origins can guide us to reform it.   
280. HEIMERT, supra note 269, at 154.
281. See id.
282. See DOUGLAS J. ELWOOD, THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY OF JONATHAN 
EDWARDS 30–31 (1960). 
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IV. THE CONSTITUTION’S SCHEME OF REPRESENTATIONS AND THE
REJECTION OF SELF-RULE 
Framer James Wilson expressed the Presbyterian distaste for 
direct democracy and the spirit of accountable representation in the 
following quote.  To summarize, the representative is intended to 
make substantive decisions that are in the best interest of the 
greater good, not to blindly follow the demands of constituents. 
This principle is reflected in the fact that the Framers rejected a 
“right to instruct” their representatives on the part of constituents 
during the term of representation:283 
Mr. Wilson could not approve of the Section as it stood, and 
could not give up his judgment to any supposed objections 
that might arise among the people.  He considered himself 
as acting & responsible for the welfare of millions not 
immediately represented in this House.  He had also asked 
himself the serious question what he should say to his 
constituents in case they should call upon him to tell them 
why he sacrificed his own Judgment in a case where they 
authorised [sic] him to exercise it?  Were he to own to them 
that he sacrificed it in order to flatter their prejudices, he 
stood dread the retort: did you suppose the people of 
Penn[sylvania] had not good sense enough to receive a good 
Government?284  
A paradox of distrust and hope, with strong Calvinist overtones, 
animated the Framers’ discussions during the Constitutional 
Convention.  Wherever the Framers looked, they accepted as a fact 
that men could and would use their power to accomplish evil, rather 
than good: “From the nature of man we may be sure, that those who 
have power in their hands will not give it up while they can retain 
it.  On the contrary we know they will always when they can rather 
increase it.”285  In James Madison’s words, “[t]he truth was that all 
283. Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace
the Myth of Self-Rule with an Attorneyship Model of Representation, 69 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 477, 494–543 (1994).  The principle is also embraced by Edmund Burke,
who stated that “[y]our representative owes you, not only his industry, but his
judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your
opinion.”  Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol (Nov. 3, 1774), in 2
THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE EDMUND BURKE 89, 95 (1866).
284. MADISON, supra note 129, at 454.
285. See id. at 266.
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men having power ought to be distrusted to a certain degree.”286  
The temper of the debates makes it quite clear that many of his 
cohorts nodded their heads in silent agreement on this point: no 
Framer even disputed it.287  And when it came time to sell the 
Constitution to the people Madison, in Federalist Number 51, 
pointed to man’s sinfulness as the fact that made government 
necessary: 
If men were angels, no government would be necessary.  If 
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal 
controls on government would be necessary.  In framing a 
government which is to be administered by men over men, 
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the 
government to control the governed; and in the next place 
oblige it to control itself.288 
Yet, while the Framers accepted the fallibility of man and his 
institutions, they did so in the context of a hardy and fundamentally 
Calvinist faith in the ability of governing structures to stem human 
nature.289  They came to their distrustful attitude through 
286. Id. at 272; see id. at 288 (statement of Elbridge Gerry) (“They will if
they acquire power like all men, abuse it.”); id. at 193 (statement of Madison) 
(“In order to judge of the form to be given to this institution, it will be proper 
to take a view of the ends to be served by it.  These were first to protect the 
people ag[ainst] their rulers . . . .”); id. at 197 (James Wilson) (referring to “tyr-
anny”); id. at 133 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The members of Cong[ress] being 
chosen by the States and subject to recall, represent all the local prejudices 
. . . .  till a tyrannic sway shall be established.”); id. at 279 (statement of Ran-
dolph) (referring to legislatures’ propensity to “perpetuate [its] power”); id. at 
323 (statement of Gouverneur Morris) (referring to “love of power [and] oppres-
sion”).  Pierce Butler, along with Charles Pinckney and John Rutledge, ex-
pressed concern with Edmund Randolph’s proposal to give the national Legis-
lature the power to enact laws “in all cases to which the State Legislatures 
were individually incompetent.”  MADISON, supra note 129, at 42–43.  Randolph 
“disclaimed any intention to give indefinite powers to the national Legislature, 
declaring that he was entirely opposed to such an inroad on the [s]tate juris-
dictions.”  Id. at 44. 
287. See id. at 271–74.
288. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (1788), reprinted in THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS 263, 264 (Ian Shapriro ed., 2009). 
289. See MADISON, supra note 129, at 44 (expressing a desire to outline the
“powers exercised by the national Legislature”); cf. id. at 187 (statement of 
Pinckney) (“The Confusion which has produced the present relaxed State is not 
owing to [the people].  It is owing to the weakness & [defects] of a Gov[ernment] 
incapable of combining the various interests it is intended to united, and 
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theological predisposition as well as the lessons of their recent 
history.  They had learned, and learned at great cost, that 
Parliament, which was supreme in England, could not be trusted; 
that King George III could not be trusted to serve the common good.  
Wherever the colonists—and later, the citizens of the United 
States—had turned for leadership and justice, they had been 
disappointed.  As heady as the success of the American 
constitutional experience has been, the Constitution’s Framers 
came to the table preoccupied with the failures of a great many 
governing schemes.  Their goal was to structure a system to avoid 
tyranny—from any corner. 
Because there was broad consensus on this goal, the 
constitutional debates typically focused on the choice of the best 
means to achieve it.  The premise for the Convention was that the 
Articles of Confederation had failed to create an entity with 
sufficient central unity to wage war, engage in foreign commerce, 
or enforce taxation.290  The Framers proceeded from this premise 
on a mission to reform—not revolutionize—the existing system.  
The Revolutionary era was over and revolution by itself had not 
yielded a workable government; serious reforms were required or 
else the confederation, which had won independence from Britain, 
would disintegrate into thirteen separate states. 
The Framers viewed themselves as laboring to achieve the 
right balance between entities and individuals likely to abuse their 
powers.291  Echoing Calvin’s assessment of the Pre-Reformation 
Roman Catholic Church’s leaders, they believed that the 
appropriate exercise of power fell between two extremes: anyone 
holding power could exercise it ineffectually or too aggressively. 
Both extremes are unacceptable.292  James Wilson put it this way: 
destitute of energy.”); id. at 222 (James Wilson) (referring to “weakness” of the 
United States under the Articles of Confederation). 
290. Id. at 91 (James Wilson) (“To correct [the Articles’] vices is the business
of this convention.”). 
291. See Marci A. Hamilton, Representation and Nondelegation: Back to Ba-
sics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 809 (1999); Marci A. Hamilton, The People: The 
Least Accountable Branch, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 4–5 (1997) (dis-
cussing images of solar system and clock); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 
Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CALIF. 
L. REV. 395, 415 (2000).
292. Compare MADISON, supra note 129, at 296 (statement of James Wilson)
(“The great fault of the existing confederacy is its inactivity.”), with id. at 288 
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“Bad govern[men]ts are of two sorts.  [First,] that which does too 
little.  [Second,] that which does too much: that which fails 
thro[ugh] weakness; and that which destroys thro[ugh] 
oppression.”293  The Articles of Confederation had produced both 
types: a weak central government and oppressive state 
government;294 the Framers tried to strengthen the national 
government without anointing it the next oppressor.295 
The Framers’ shared focus on identifying and preventing 
abuses of power (whether through inaction or aggression) did not 
mean they agreed on which governmental structure would tend to 
tyranny.  Rather, these conclusions were empirical.  In context of 
discussing whether there ought to be popular elections, Mason 
asserted his frustration with the differing empirical claims: “[a]t 
one moment we are told that the Legislature is entitled to thorough 
confidence, and to indefinite power.  At another, that it will be 
governed by intrigue & corruption, and cannot be trusted at all.”296  
James Wilson responded that “[t]he legisl[atu]re might deserve 
confidence in some respects, and distrust in others.”297  Madison 
advised the Framers to distrust all men to some degree.298  Mason 
disagreed, instead agreeing with Governor Morris that “[t]he best 
course that could be taken would be to leave the interests of the 
people to the Representatives of the people.”299  In turn, it was 
declared that “[t]he legislature will continually seek to aggrandize 
(statement of Elbridge Gerry) (stating that “all men [ ] abuse” the power given 
to them). 
293. Id. at 222.
294. See id. (statement of James Wilson) (“Under which of these evils do the
U. States at present groan?  [U]nder the weakness and the inefficiency of its
Govern[men]t.”); id. at 296 (statement of Wilson) (“The great fault of the exist-
ing confederacy is its inactivity.  It has never been a complaint ag[ain]st
Cong[res]s that they governed overmuch.  The complaint has been that they
have governed too little.  To remedy this defect we were sent here.”).
295. See id. at 201 (statement of Luther Martin) (stressing that the federal
government’s “powers ought to be kept within narrow limits”). 
296. Id. at 308.
297. Id. at 309.
298. NEIL H. COGAN, CONTEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY 
COLLECTION ON PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 618 (1999). 
299. Id. at 619.
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and perpetuate themselves, and will seize those critical moments 
produced by war, invasion or convulsion for that purpose.”300   
In short, the disagreements at the Convention reflected not 
different assessments of human nature or different judgements 
regarding ancient or modern forms of government—on these topics 
there was general agreement—but rather different empirical 
assessments by each Framer of the governing structure examined. 
Witherspoon’s Calvinist stamp seems quite evident here.  The 
Convention’s approach was empirical and experimental.  Using 
their experiences and education—not abstract thought alone—they 
made factual calculations, tested their hypotheses against known 
experience, and set forth the Constitution as an experimental 
model likely in need of recurrent tinkering to make it work.  The 
Constitution was a machine to be set down in the real world and 
subjected to the stresses and challenges of actual people.  Like 
Calvin, the Framers feared for the failure of their experiment.  In 
the cover letter addressed to Congress that accomplished the 
Constitution, they acknowledged that their product was not perfect 
and would likely be in need of reform in the future.301 
CONCLUSION 
The answer to whether the United States is a “Christian 
nation” is complicated, but it is fair to reject the notion that it is a 
country that was designed to be controlled by one set of religious 
principles or a religious dogma.  Rather, the Constitution’s founding 
is steeped in the humility of a deep appreciation of human frailty 
and the dangers posed by power, and we have the Calvinist 
influence to thank for that.  I would posit that this embrace of 
distrust and hope in the constitutional design is a major contributor 
to the resilience of the constitutional order. 
My answer to the question of whether the United States is a 
“Christian nation”—if what one means is that the United States is 
limited to a singular religious viewpoint and certain Christian 
morals—is that such a claim is evidence of the hubris the Calvinists 
wisely warned us against.   
300. MADISON, supra note 129, at 322.
301. See id. at 626–27.
